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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the macroeconomic effects of trade 
policy, when the instrument is a voluntary export restraint (VER), on both the 
home (imposing) country and the foreign (targeted) country.  The innovation 
in the paper is the analysis of trade policy when debt servicing is present in the 
current account of the balance of payments.  This captures the contemporary 
experience of deficit nations like the USA vis-à-vis surplus countries like 
China. Trade policy (VER) in the short-run affects the current account and 
exchange rate, leading to the accumulation of debt stocks, which have to be 
repaid in the long-run in the form of debt servicing flows.  This leads to a major 
difference between the short and long-run effects of trade policy in the form 
of VERs, which can be expansionary and contractionary respectively for the 
trade policy initiating nation. 
Keywords 
Macroeconomic effects of trade policy; voluntary export restraints; debt 
servicing 
JEL codes: F34, F41 
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SHORT AND LONG RUN MACROECONOMIC 
EFFECTS OF TRADE POLICY IN THE 
PRESENCE OF DEBT SERVICING 
1 INTRODUCTION 
It would be a truism to state that the current global economic contraction is 
deemed to be the most significant global economic crisis since the great 
depression of the 1930s. The present predicament originated in a financial 
crisis that had repercussions for the real economy, and was rapidly transmitted 
from the United States to the rest of the world. The national income 
compressions that followed were, however, asymmetric, with many dynamic 
Asian economies only experiencing a decline in their (positive) growth rates, 
while other countries (developed and developing) nations witnessed a 
diminution of their national income. All of this occurred against the backdrop 
of what has come to be known as ‘global imbalances’. This refers to the 
differences between deficit nations like the United States (which also 
simultaneously runs a huge government budget deficit), the UK and many 
other European nations, and the surplus countries exemplified by China 
(which has become the world’s largest exporter of goods and the second 
largest economy in absolute terms), Japan, Germany and many other Asian 
economies. Furthermore, the vast trade surpluses of countries like China are 
not, in the main, absorbed domestically, but instead held in the form of safe 
short-term dollar denominated assets such as US treasury bills. It has been 
argued that this behaviour is predicated on a precautionary principle leading 
China into hoarding a war chest of financial reserves (in dollars) to be deployed 
in the event of a speculative attack on its currency. Haunted by the spirit of 
financial crises past in the East Asian region, China is also reluctant to fully 
liberalize capital account transactions in its balance of payments. 
The recent global recession has also seen a dramatic contraction in world 
trade, unparalleled since the inter-war period associated with the great 
depression. Although trade is predicted to recover, this sort of negative shock 
in an otherwise globalizing economy for the last half a century, can engender a 
phenomenon known as trade uncertainty; see van Bergeijk (2009) and 
references therein. Uncertainty about the smooth functioning of the channels 
of future international trade can have an independent, and additional, adverse 
effect on the real economy. Added to that is the loss of confidence that 
characterises deep depressions, as opposed to more temporary recessions. 
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) refer to this as the confidence multiplier, something 
that is unusually buoyant in the boom years prior to the recession, and equally 
stubbornly gloomy in refusing to revive during the course of a depression. 
When the confidence is low, the expansionary impact of the usual fiscal and 
monetary stimuli is much more muted, as in the case of Japan since the early 
1990s. Akerlof and Shiller (2009) also point out that when economic 
confidence is at its nadir, individualized stories about corruption and other 
nefarious activities contributing the downturn abound in the popular mind. 
Apart from the usual suspects (bankers and financiers), blame may also be laid 
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at the feet of nations such as China for ‘exporting too much’, and a revival of 
confidence might necessitate the politically attractive option of some bilateral 
trade policy restricting goods from China into the USA (or Europe for that 
matter); see Grossman and Helpman (1994) on how lobby groups induce 
specific forms of protectionism via political campaign contributions. There are 
frequent accusations levied against China for gaining ‘unfair’ competitive 
advantage by artificially engineering real exchange rate devaluation. The 
Chinese are also charged with being a nation of excessive savers, compared to 
the negative saving propensities of American households, where arguably a 
different brand of consumer capitalism abounds (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). 
Trade policy targeted specifically towards China could also serve to reduce 
trade uncertainty as described and analyzed in van Bergeijk (2009). The 
multilateral framework governing international trade could then be 
complemented and supplemented by bilateral negotiations; this too can 
become a part of economic diplomacy (van Bergeijk, 2009).  
Recently there has been a revival of ‘Keynesian’ demand management 
policies that aim to increase output and employment via boosting aggregate 
demand. Keynes (1936) himself came around to the view that protectionism 
could also provide a macroeconomic boost during a deep recession.  Exports 
are a component of aggregate demand and imports represent a leakage from 
domestic demand, hence policies that switch expenditure from foreign to 
domestic sources would raise domestic aggregate demand via. One instrument 
that achieves this goal could be bilateral trade policies that restrict imports 
from a major source. It is not inconceivable that a powerful nation such as the 
United States (arguably the post-war engine of global economic growth) might 
convince a major foreign supplier to its market like China to restrict its sales 
within the USA out of fear of greater future disruption, were the American 
economy to falter even further. A potential future threat of greater trade 
disruption may induce China to reduce its current sales in the USA in order to 
preserve orderly economic relations in the foreseeable future, thereby granting 
a Keynesian boost to the US economy.  
Trade policy could also become a substitute for the traditional instruments 
of stabilisation (fiscal/monetary) policy, given the constraints placed on the 
other policy instruments because of growing central bank independence, and 
the burgeoning debt following the 2008 financial crisis in ‘deficit’ nations like 
the USA or the UK, for example. It could also be a means of redistributing 
income towards factors of production in certain industries.  It has been argued 
that trade policy has small direct output effects when compared with 
fiscal/monetary policy.  But such an assertion neglects the real exchange 
consequences of trade policy in its various forms.  Real exchange rate changes 
result from the balance of payments effects of trade policy.  These have 
consequences not only for international competitiveness, but also for debt 
servicing flows.  Changes in debt servicing flows have, in turn, income and 
output repercussions.  In order to explore these debt servicing implications for 
the macroeconomy, it is necessary to distinguish between the short and long-
run, as pioneered by Rodriguez (1979) who analyzed fiscal and monetary policy 
in the presence of debt servicing within a single small open economy setting.     
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of trade policy in the 
form of a voluntary export restraint (VER) on the macroeconomies of both the 
home (imposing) country and the foreign (targeted) country.  The analytical 
treatment of a VER differs from that applicable to a traditional tariff or quota, 
as it is the exporter and not the importer who obtains the revenues from the 
trade restriction.  Trade policy in the form of a VER is inherently bilateral in 
nature and it is the favoured form of trade policy engaged in by countries or 
blocs such as the United States (or even the European Union) when the target 
of the trade policy is a particular country, China say.  This is the example in 
mind in this paper. A VER is also relatively more WTO compatible. 
The literature on the macroeconomic analyses of VERs is relatively scant.  
Examples of the latter include Murshed (1992) who compares VERs with 
tariffs in the North-South context, and Murshed and Sen (1999) who analyze 
the capital account effects of VERs.  The innovation in this paper is the 
analysis of trade policy in the form of VERs when debt servicing enters the 
current account of the balance of payments.  Current account deficits lead to the 
accumulation of the stock of debt which has to be repaid in the future in the 
form of debt servicing flows.  This leads to a difference between the short and 
long-run effects of trade policy in the form of VERs.  In the short-run the 
effects of VER type trade policy impact on the current account.  These current 
account changes eventually cause alterations in debt stocks, requiring debt 
servicing.   In the long-run equilibrium, by definition, no changes in stocks are 
possible, and appropriate adjustments to bring this about must take place in 
the economy.  Thus, in the long-run, the debt servicing implications of the 
VER will have fully worked their way through the economies in question.  This 
can lead to the reversal of the short-run effects of the VER in the long-run.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section II contains a sketch of the 
two country macroeconomic model; Sections III and IV contain the short and 
long-run effects respectively of trade policy; finally section V briefly concludes.                      
  2   THE MODEL 
We will employ a two country variant of the Rodriguez (1979) model.  We 
ignore the monetary side of the economy as we wish to focus on the (debt 
servicing inclusive) current account effects of the VER.  Although our model 
does not explicitly incorporate imperfect competition in product markets, the 
presence of excess capacity in goods markets brings about the same flavour in 
our results as imperfect (monopolistic) competition. 
The equilibrium relation for the home (VER imposing) country's goods 
market is given by: 
 
)1)(1))(1(;();())1(;( *** vverDYeXevX
e
rDYXverDYEY +++−+−+++=  
 
where Y stands for income; E for expenditure; X for exports; X* for imports; e 
for the exchange rate, a rise in e is a depreciation (appreciation) of the home 
(foreign) currency; the stock of debt, D, is in one unit of home currency (say 
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dollars) and can be either positive or negative; rD represents debt servicing, r is 
the relevant interest rate; v is the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of the VER quota, 
following Brecher and Bhagwati (1987).  Expenditure depends on debt 
servicing augmented disposable income, E1 > 0.  E2 > 0, this is the Laursen-
Metzler (1950) effect, see Murshed (1997, chapter2, pp. 25-27) for a detailed 
derivation.  Our argument for its inclusion is that it played an important role in 
Mundell's (1961) seminal work on the macroeconomic effects of tariffs.  E2 = 
X*(1-ε), ε < 1 is the elasticity of real expenditure with respect to real income.  
The intuition behind it is that an exchange rate depreciation lowers real income 
(defined in terms of home and imported goods prices), but real expenditure 
declines less than proportionately, hence nominal expenditure increases.  X1 > 
0, X2 > 0, X1* > 0, X2* < 0.  Note that we have normalised domestic and 
foreign prices at P=P*=1.  The initial VER rate, v=0, but dv≠0. 
 
An asterisk (*) denotes foreign country variables.  Goods market equilibrium in 
the foreign economy is given by: 
 
Y* = E*(Y*-rDe +vX*;
1
e)+X*(Y+rD;e(1+v))-
X
e(Y*-
rD
e +vX*;e)  (2) 
 
In (2) the exchange rate is employed in the opposite direction of the home 
country.  The signs of the various partial derivatives in (2) are symmetrical to 
those in (1).  It should be borne in mind that the VER rent accrues to the 
exporting country, unlike a tariff or quota when rents are retained by the 
importer. Thus, the foreign economy potentially benefits from a positive 
income effect, just as the home economy should gain from a price or 
substitution effect shifting expenditure towards its own goods. 
 
The current account of the balance of payments is defined for the home 
economy, exactly the converse applies to the foreign economy.  We include 
debt servicing flows (rD) in addition to the difference between exports and 
imports (trade account) in the current account, following Rodriguez (1979).  D 
stands for the stock of debt denominated in home currency units, rD denotes 
debt servicing flows where r is the interest rate on debt.  The current account, 
therefore, has two components, trade balance and debt servicing flows: 
 
D = X(.) - eX*(.)(1 + v) + rD 
 
The above relation states that current account surpluses will contribute to the 
home country's becoming a creditor (or a reduction in its indebted status) as D 
is accumulated, similarly current account deficits will contribute to its 
becoming a debtor (or a diminution of its creditor ranking).  In the short-run 
the inherited debt stocks are non-zero, D0.  Current account imbalances 
arising from the impact of the VER will, however, lead to changes in the stock 
of debt which have to be eliminated in the long-run equilibrium. We postulate 
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that the home (foreign) country deficits (surpluses) causes the exchange rate to 
depreciate (appreciate), i.e. e rises:   
 
e = eX*(.)(1 + v) - X(.) - rD   (3)  
 
In order to proceed we totally differentiate (1)-(3), and arrange them in matrix 
form: 
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a11 = E1-1-eX
*
1
a12 = X1
a13 = X2-eX
*
2+
X1rD
e2 -εX
*
a21 = X
*
1
a22 = E
*
1-1-
X1
e
a23 = X
*
2-
X2
e -
X1rD
e3 +
E*1rD+εX
e2
a31 = eX
*
1
a32 = -X1
a33 = X
*+eX*2-X2-
rDX1
e2
b11 = eεX
*-X1X
*+e2X*2
b12 = 
X1X
*
e -E
*
1X
*-eX*2
b13 = X1X
*- e2X*2 - eX
*
 
 
Next we investigate the stability of the model.  The trace is negative if a33 < 0; 
the Marshall-Lerner conditions hold, i.e. if an exchange rate depreciation (rise 
in e) improves the domestic trade balance and vice versa.  The determinant of 
the Jacobian, J = 
 
(E1-1)
rDX1
e2
 + (E1-1)(E
*
1-1)(X
*+eX
*
2-X2+
X1Xε
e2
) - (1-E
*
1)eX
*
1X
*ε  (5) 
A requirement of stability is that (5) is negative.  This is so only if a33 < 0; if the 
Marshall-Lerner conditions hold.  If D > 0, this is also sufficient; if D < 0, 
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then X > rD, the indebted (home) country's export revenues must exceed debt 
servicing. 
3   SHORT-RUN MULTIPLIERS 
We now analyze the short-run or impact multipliers of the system.  As far as 
these multipliers are concerned we postulate, as in Rodriguez (1979), that dD = 
0, but D ≠ 0.  This means that on impact the historically given debt stocks 
cannot change, but the inherited stock of debt may be positive or negative.  If 
D > 0 the home country is the creditor nation, but if D < 0 it is the foreign 
economy which is the creditor country.  Turning to the multipliers we find 
that: 
 
dY
dv = [1 - ε][X*X*X1- eX2X*(1-E
*
1)- 
rDX1X
*
e ] +
εX*X
e  (ε - X1)  (6) 
 
divided through by J < 0, given from (5) above.  dY/dv > 0 only if (i)  X2 >X1 
and (ii) X1 > ε in absolute value.  The VER on impact will lead to an 
improvement in the foreign country's current account as long as it receives 
more revenues for exporting a smaller quantity (a positive VER rent). This 
seems plausible, and is in conformity with the stylised facts when the VER is 
effected by an economy like China, whose export quality appears to be 
increasing.  What it really implies is that the subjects of trade restrictions are 
high quality goods, which are inelastically demanded. The improvement in the 
foreign economy's current account will lead to its currency appreciating, under 
flexible exchange rates (see equation 8 below). This means that the home 
country's (the USA's) currency depreciates. This should eventually raise 
aggregate demand in the home country via improvements in net exports.  For 
this to successfully occur, and raise output, X2 the price elasticity of its exports 
in the foreign country must be high.  Also the home economy benefits from a 
positive Laursen-Metzler effect as its currency depreciates.  This is greater the 
smaller is ε, the elasticity of absorption (expenditure) with respect to real 
income.   
 
dY*
dv  = [E1-1][-E
*
1X
*eX*2 + E
*
1X
*
2rD - 
X1X
*
e2 (rD + εX) + X
*
2εX 
 
+X
*
e (E
*
1rD + εX) + X*X*( -E
*
1 + 
X1
e ) - X2X
*(1 - E*1)] 
 
+ X*X*1(ε - 1)[E
*
1rD + εX - eE
*
1X
*]   (7) 
 
divided through by J < 0.  dY*/dv is ambiguous in sign. Even though the 
foreign economy benefits from the VER rent, currency appreciation potentially 
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crowds out these gains via the deterioration in the trade balance.  Also if it is a 
creditor economy, rD < 0, it will suffer from a negative wealth effect. This is 
because D is denominated in dollars, and its value in local currency declines as 
the dollar depreciates (each dollar fetches less in remimbi units). 
 
)(  0 > 
J
)] - (1XXe)[E - (1 -)] E - )(1 + (1X1)[e-E( = 
dv
de **12*1*1*1 8εΩ  
 
This means that the home (foreign) country's exchange rate depreciates 
(appreciates) as long as Ω = eX*2/X*, the price elasticity of demand of the 
restricted import is inelastically demanded (less than 1 in absolute value).  This 
is also a condition for a positive VER rent for China after the trade restriction 
is imposed. 
4   LONG-RUN MULTIPLIERS 
The analysis in section III was concerned with impact (short-run) multipliers.  
In the long-run steady-state equilibrium there must be no change in stocks, 
which in turn means that the current account in totality must balance. The debt 
servicing implications of the VER fully work through the two economies in the 
long-run.  A trade account surplus must be matched by a negative debt 
servicing inflows and vice versa.  This means that in the steady-state (long-run), 
dD = 0 but d(rD) ≠ 0.  Thus, although changes in debt stocks are zero, debt 
servicing inflows could be non-zero (see Rodriguez, 1979).  The mechanism of 
change in the current account is debt servicing, d(rD) replaces de.  Equation (3) 
is replaced by: 
 
X(.) - eX*(.)(1 + v) + rD = 0  (9) 
 
The various aij in (4) alter as follows (the bij are unaltered): 
 
a13 = E1-
X1
e -eX
*
1
a23 = -
E*1
e +X
*
1+
X1
e2
a33 = eX
*
1+
X1
e -1
 
 
The model is stable and the determinant of the Jacobian now becomes: 
 
J = [E1-1][1-E
*
1] - 2X
*
1X1 < 0  (5)′ 
 
Turning to the long-run effects of the VER: 
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dY
dv = 
[1-E*1][eεX*(1 - eX
*
1) + eΩX
*(1- E1) - eX
*(E1- eX
*
1)]
J   (10) 
 
dY*
dv  = 
[1 - E*1][eX
*
2(E1 - 1) - eX*X
*
1(1 - ε)]
J   (11) 
 
dY/dv in the long-run is negative only if  |ε(1 - eX1*| > |Ω (1 - E1)| in 
absolute value; dY*/dv > 0 if | eX1*| > |Ω|; and |1 -ε| > |1 - E1|,  both in 
absolute value. 
 
)12(0)( >=
dv
de
dv
rDd  
 
This is positive and can be verified by examining equation (8) above.  It means 
that the home (foreign) economy experiences positive (negative) debt servicing 
flows in the long-run equilibrium. 
The intuition behind the above results can be best understood by tracing 
the movements from the impact multipliers in the short-run to the steady-state 
equilibrium. The effect of the VER for the home country in the short-run 
causes its exchange rate to depreciate, improving its trade balance.  This will 
improve its credit standing, as either its debt is reduced or its creditor position 
is enhanced.  For the foreign economy exchange rate appreciation worsens the 
trade balance in the short-run.  This leads to an accumulation of debt or its 
previous creditor status is diminished.  In the long-run this increased debtor 
(or reduced creditor status) eventually requires debt servicing which needs to 
be financed via improved export performance.  This increase in net exports is 
precisely what causes the foreign country's output to rise in the long-run 
equilibrium.  We have noted that in the long-run equilibrium the current 
account in total must balance, there can be no changes in debt stocks.  For the 
home economy the long-run effect of the VER leads to a reduction in its trade 
balance, exactly matched in value by positive debt servicing inflows.   The 
converse results apply to the foreign country.  
These results are depicted in figure 1 and 2 for the home and foreign 
economy respectively, and are obtained from the aij coefficients above.  The 
YY (Y*Y*) schedule depicts goods market equilibrium. A rise in output 
increases net imports which has to be matched by positive debt servicing 
making the schedule positive (negative) for the home (foreign) country. A 
similar line of reasoning is applicable to the external balance schedules, rD.  
The initial point before the VER is indicated at A, and the post VER long-run 
outcome is shown at point B. 
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5   CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, therefore, the short (impact) and long-run effects of trade policy 
in the form of VERs could be diametrically opposite, given the presence of 
debt servicing.  Indeed it can be argued that there is a trade off between the 
short-run and long-run effects.  In the short-run the VER causes exchange rate 
depreciation in the home economy.  This improves its current account and 
raises output in the home country.  In the foreign economy exchange rate 
appreciation crowds out the benefits of the VER rent.  The foreign country's 
current account surplus worsens as its currency gets stronger, lowering output 
there.  In the long-run, however, the signs of the impact multipliers are 
reversed.  The increase in debt (or the reduction in its creditor status) 
accumulated by the foreign country following the impact effect of the VER has 
to be paid off through increased net exports in the future, which is beneficial 
to output.  The converse occurs in the home economy, where the short-run 
benefits of the improved trade balance are lost in the long-run, and its 
equilibrium output declines.  Both the short and long-run multipliers for the 
VER, as far as the home or VER initiating country is concerned, are similar to 
the results in Rodriguez (1979) for monetary policy in a single country. 
The moral of the story is that Keynesian minded trade policies aiming to 
boost domestic output may not work in the long-term when debt has to be re-
paid, and that the debtor status of countries like the United States cannot be 
deemed to last indefinitely. Furthermore, politically expedient trade policies 
that are at least partially engineered by lobbying groups that target specific 
exporters and are aimed at rebuilding business confidence have differential 
short and long-run effects; the latter typically being fully discounted by the 
almost universally myopic political process. 
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